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Abstract. The i* Strategic Dependency model has been successfully employed 
to analyze trust relationships of networks of agents during the early stages of 
multiagent systems development. However, the model only supports limited 
trust reasoning due to its limitation to deal with the vulnerability of the 
depender regarding the failure of the dependency. In this paper, we introduce 
the concept of willingness, which provides a solution to the above problem and 
therefore allows a more complete analysis and reasoning of trust relationships 
in networks of agents. 
1   Introduction 
An interesting challenge for the agent research community is the development of 
large-scale dependable Multiagent Systems. As stated in the Call for Papers (CFP) for 
the SELMAS’06 workshop, “the dependability of a computing system is its ability to 
deliver service that can be justifiably trusted”. In multiagent systems, which consist of 
network of agents, this means that the developer needs to analyze explicitly the trust 
relationships between the different agents of the network/system.  
The i* Strategic Dependency (SD) model has been employed to model trust 
relationships between agents and in many cases has been stated for its appropriateness 
to explore trust relationships during the early stages of a multiagent system’s 
development. The rich modeling concepts supported by the model provide a better 
basis to explore the broader implications of trust relationships than conventional non-
intentional models, such as data flow diagrams and/or object-oriented analysis 
languages (e.g. UML). Moreover, the model does not treat trust as an isolated concept 
with special semantics but in parallel with the rest of the system’s goals. Additionally, 
the model facilitates the analysis of trust-related issues within the full operations and 
social context of the system-to-be and it also supports trade-off analysis of trust and 
other competing quality requirements such as performance. 
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The SD model [9] is used to construct a network of social dependencies amongst 
actors, where an actor represents an entity such as an agent that has intentionality and 
strategic goals within the information system or within its organisational setting. In 
particular, the model is a graph, where each node represents an actor, and each link 
between two actors indicates that one actor depends on another for something in order 
that the former may attain some goal. A dependency describes an “agreement” (called 
dependum) between two actors: the depender and the dependee. The depender is the 
depending actor, and the dependee is the actor who is depended upon. The SD 
supports different types of dependencies describing the nature of the agreement. Goal 
dependencies are used to represent the transfer of responsibility for fulfilling a goal. 
Softgoal dependencies are similar to goal dependencies, but their fulfilments cannot 
be precisely defined (for instance, the appreciation is subjective or the fulfilments can 
occur only in a given extent); task dependencies are used in situations where the 
dependee is required to perform a given action; and resource dependencies require the 
dependee to provide a resource for the depender. 
However, the SD model demonstrates a limitation related to the vulnerability of the 
depender regarding the failure of the dependency1. Such limitation restricts 
developers in performing a full reasoning about the trust relationships of the system-
to-be. In this paper we present an approach based on the concept of willingness to 
overcome this limitation. 
It is worth mentioning that due to lack of space, we have decided to adopt a 
simplified notation for the purpose of this paper. In particular, agents are denoted by 
the set Ag noted as a, b,… ∈ Ag. We note the set of services S and a particular service 
as sx where sx ⊆ S. 
− depender(a, sx) means that a is depender for the service sx. 
− dependee(a, sx) means that a is dependee about the service sx.  
− depends(a, b, sx) means that a is depender, b is dependee about the service sx 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the vulnerability 
limitation inherent to i*. Section 3 introduces the concept of willingness and defines 
its different constituent elements, whereas Section 4 illustrates the concepts and 
limitations with the aid of scenarios. Section 5 discusses how willingness can be 
positively influenced to strengthen a dependency and Section 6 proposes the 
introduction of the delegation relationship. Finally, Section 7 presents related work 
while Section 8 concludes the paper and briefly presents future works.  
2   The Down-side of a Dependency  
Although the Strategic Dependency model has been successfully employed to 
model trust relationships of networks of agents during the early stages of multiagent 
systems development, it supports limited trust reasoning due to its limitation to deal 
with the vulnerability of the depender regarding the failure of the dependency [9] (we 
call this the down-side of a dependency). This is an important issue since potential 
failure of dependencies may not only hurt the depender, but it may set off a perilous 
                                                          
1 We define failure of a dependency as the situation in which a dependee fails or refuses to 
satisfy the dependency.  
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chain reaction that would endanger the whole system. This prevents developers to 
fully reason about the trust between the agents of the system, which results in 
incomplete analysis of the trust relationships of the network.  
In general, the above mentioned limitation is influenced by two elements. The first 
element is the vulnerability of the depender which is an intrinsic property of the 
dependency for the depender. The second element, that we call “failure of the 
dependency” is directly related to the dependee(s). 
The next sections discuss these two components of the “down-side” of a dependency 
and present some definitions of the related concepts. 
2.1   The Depender’s side 
In our work, and in order to sustain our analysis of the first constituent of the 
“down-side” of a dependency, we define the concept of vulnerability as follows: 
Vulnerability is a characteristic of the depender that causes the agent to suffer of 
some incapability to achieve its goals as a result of the dependee’s failure to achieve 
the dependum.  
This definition emphasizes the concept of vulnerability as an internal quality of the 
depender in a dependency. In other words, the vulnerability of an agent, with respect 
to the dependum, is only related to the importance of the dependum for that agent.  
The i* SD model [9, 10] distinguishes three degrees of strength (importance) for a 
dependency that can be applied independently on each side: Open (“O”), Committed 
(unmarked) and Critical (“X”). The degree of strength for the depender corresponds to 
its level of vulnerability about the dependum. In an Open Dependency, failure of the 
dependum would have no serious consequences on the depender and therefore the 
depender’s vulnerability is low. In a Committed Dependency, failure of the dependum 
might significantly affect the depender’s goals and therefore the depender’s 
vulnerability is average. In a Critical Dependency failure of the dependum would 
seriously affect the depender’s goals and therefore the depender’s vulnerability is 
high. 
As a response to the “down-side” of a dependency, Yu [9] suggests three 
mechanisms: enforcement, assurance and insurance. An Enforcement mechanism 
consists of finding some way for the depender to cause some goal of the dependee to 
fail, e.g. if there is a reciprocal dependency.  Assurance refers to a situation where 
there is some evidence that the dependee has an interest in delivering the dependum, 
e.g. if the fulfilling of the commitment is in the dependee’s own interest. It is worth 
mentioning that these two measures would only have an impact on the dependee’s 
behaviour about the dependum and internally the depender’s vulnerability would 
never be mitigated. Finally, insurance mechanisms are supposed to reduce 
vulnerability of a depender by reducing the degree of dependence on a particular 
dependee. The consequence of such measure is not a mitigation of the depender’s 
vulnerability, but rather a potential increasing of the probability that the dependum 
will be achieved. Conversely to Yu’s claim, all these mechanisms only contribute to 
fortifying a dependency, and do not help to mitigate vulnerability. Effective measures 
to mitigate vulnerability should rather try to influence importance of the dependum 
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for the depender, e.g. by creating alternatives to the dependum or its parent goal(s) 
internally at the depender’s side. 
2.2   The Dependee’s side 
This second element catches the dependee’s influence on the “down-side” of the 
dependency. In particular, the factors, at the dependee’s side, which contribute to the 
success or the failure of the dependency are analysed. To enable the success of a 
dependency, the dependee must have at least three qualities regarding the dependum: 
ability, authorization and willingness. The ability and authorization qualities of a 
dependee have been previously discussed by Giorgini et al. [6]. However, the 
dependee’s willingness about the dependum remains an open question. The next 
section presents a detailed discussion of the dependee’s willingness and its different 
constituents. 
3   Dependee’s Willingness 
The willingness (W°) of an agent about a dependum expresses its intrinsic 
readiness to actually fulfil the dependum. It is based on the combination of three 
elements: the criticality (C°) of the dependum for the dependee; the pressure (P°) on 
the dependee about the dependum; and the reciprocity (R°) with the depender(s). The 
willingness of an agent involved in the system can be derived for a specific goal, task 
or resource. The impact of the different constituent elements is weighted by weight 
parameters (α,β,γ) according to the domain application. These parameters enable the 
designer to adjust influence of the different factors to better suit the context of the 
implementation, i.e. a β or γ greater than α corresponds to reputation-based systems 
or systems with a high degree of cooperation. Moreover, to be able to compare values 
computed for different agents, the willingness is constrained between 0 and 1 by 
imposing the different factor’s values range from 0 to 1 and the sum of the weight 
parameters equal to 1.  
 
W°(a, sx) = α * C°( a, sx) + β * P°( a, sx) + γ * R°( a, sx)         where dependee(a, sx) 
 
A running example is used in the rest of the paper, to assist readers in 
understanding these elements. The example forms a view of a substantial case study. 
In this example, four agents are identified: Bob is purchasing manager, Alice and Jos 
are accountants and Bert is stock manager. Additionally, for sake of simplicity, in this 
approach, the notion of service is used to refer to a goal, a task, or a resource. 
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Fig. 1. a. Criticality - b. Pressure - c. Reciprocity 
3.1   Criticality 
The criticality (C°) factor indicates the degree of importance a service has for an 
agent. This importance is based on the value of the service for the agent intrinsically, 
i.e. apart from any claim of other agent(s). The achievement of a dependum may be 
critical for a dependee, for different reasons. For instance when the dependee has 
some goals related to the achievement of the dependum. 
Example 1 According to the company procedures, Alice is responsible for the 
accounting of the managers. She needs achievement of “payment decision” for each 
manager to do the accounting. Bob must have the payment decision about its order 
given by an accountant of the company. So Bob seek for Alice payment decision 
(Fig.1.a). 
In example 1, the goal of Alice, “do the accounting” is linked to the achievement 
of “payment decision” service. As a consequence, this service turns to be critical for 
Alice. These circumstances increase her willingness about its achievement. Through 
criticality analysis we have quantified some evidence that the dependee, Alice, has 
some interest to fulfill, apart from any claim of the depender, Bob.  
Decision about the level of criticality of a service for an agent is taken by the 
designer. 
C°(a, sx) in [0,1] where  dependee(a, sx) 
3.2   Pressure 
The pressure (P°) factor indicates the degree of influence that a group of dependers 
(targeting the same dependum) has on the dependee’s behaviour. It is an external 
factor that impacts the dependee’s willingness about the achievement of the 
dependum. 
Example 2 According to the company procedures, Bob needs a payment decision 
on its order and Bert needs payment decision to decide on the entry of an item in the 
stock. Yet, this decision can only be given by a company’s accountant. So Bob and 
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Bert seek for Alice payment decision. (Fig.1b) 
The dependency in example 2 has two dependers (Bob and Bert) about a 
dependum “payment decision” depending on Alice. Alice is therefore under pressure 
of Bob and Bert about this service. This pressure increases her willingness to fulfil the 
dependum. 
To refine our analysis, different levels of pressure can be identified according to 
the relative position occupied by a depender. For example, in real working conditions, 
the pressure imposed by Bob, the purchasing manager, can be considered greater than 
the pressure imposed by Bert, the stock manager. Consequently, the global pressure 
becomes the sum of the weighted individual pressure of the dependers involved. The 
weight (p) given to a position is determined by the designer or according to the 
application domain.  
)*exp(/11),( ∑−=° iix agpsaP    
where dependee(a, ) and xs
 ),,( xii saagdependsAgag ∈  
3.3   Reciprocity 
The reciprocity (R°) factor indicates the influence of relations of mutual 
dependence between the dependee and some depender(s).  
Such reciprocal relationship makes the dependee, at her turn, vulnerable to the 
behaviour of the depender. Considering that agents basically follow rules of tit-for-tat, 
a situation of reciprocal relationship should positively influence the behaviour of the 
dependee agent about the fulfilment of the dependum.  
Example 3 According to the company procedures, the purchase manager is 
responsible for office materials order for all employees of the company. Therefore, 
Alice needs Bob to get her office material whereas Bob needs accountant payment 
decision on its order. So Bob seeks for Alice’s payment decision. (Fig.1c) 
In example 3, there is a relation of mutual dependence between Bob and Alice. As 
Alice is depending upon Bob, she would rather adopt behaviour in favour of Bob to 
positively influence Bob’s behaviour concerning her request. As agents adopt a tit-
for-tat strategy, a reciprocal relationship increases the willingness of the dependee 
about the fulfilment of the dependum.   
Moreover, we may reasonably argue that the more critical the dependum of the 
reciprocal dependency is for the dependee, the more this reciprocity increases its 
willingness. Therefore, the reciprocity factor is not only based on the number of 
mutual dependencies but also on their respective criticality for the dependee. In the 
example, if the criticality of “get material” service increases for Alice, her willingness 
about “payment decision” will be greater. 
The formulae below can be used to determine the pressure that some depender(s) 
impose on a dependee. 
}),(exp{
11),( ∑ °−=° yx saCsaR  
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The reciprocity factor is directly related to the depender’s claim; it turns into figures 
the ability of the depender to cause some goal of the dependee to fail 
4   Scenarios 
When agents need to be involved in a dependency, they should trust the dependee. 
This trust reflects its estimation on the willingness of the dependee to personally fulfil 
the dependum. The previous section has presented the different elements that could 
help to determine this value. At the end of the estimation of a dependee’s willingness 
about a service, the depender may decide that the willingness value is high enough for 
the dependency to remain unchanged or that the value is low. In the second case, the 
depender should try to improve willingness value. One solution consists in positively 
influencing, through specific measures, the determinants of this value: criticality, 
pressure or reciprocity. To sustain the presentation of such measures and to 
demonstrate the applicability of our work, we present three scenarios, based on the 
running example case study, which emphasize different dependency’s settings with 
variations on dependees’ side. 
Scenario 1 is the simplest dependency’s configuration scenario which involves one 
depender and one dependee about a unique dependum.  
Scenario 1 According to the company procedures, Bob must have the payment 
decision about its order given by an accountant of the company. So Bob seeks for 
Alice’s payment decision (Fig.2a). 
Scenarios 2 and 3 illustrate situations of one depender with several dependees. 
Scenario 2 According to the company procedures, Bob needs a decision on its 
payment order. Yet, this decision can only be given by one of the company’s 
accountants. So Bob seeks for Alice or Jos payment decision. (Fig.2b) 
Scenario 3 According to the company procedures, Bob needs a decision on its 
payment order. Yet, this decision must be given by two company’s accountants. So 
Bob seeks for payment decision of Alice and Jos. (Fig.2c) 
Although these scenarios might seem similar, they emphasise differences in the 
dependencies between the agents of the system. For instance, in scenario 2 Bob can 
obtain payment decision from either Alice or Jos. Conversely, in scenario 3, Bob must 
have the payment decision fulfilled by the intervention of both Alice and Jos.  
The i* SD model does not provide concepts and notations to emphasize such 
distinctions. Therefore, we propose to lightly extend the SD model of i* with concepts 
that enables the modelling of such situations. In particular, we define the following:   
A dependency with substitute dependees means that each dependee is able to fulfil 
alone the dependum. 
A dependency with complementary dependees means that contribution of all 
dependees is required to fulfil the dependum. 
The Bob, Alice and Jos relationship derived from scenario 2 corresponds to a 
dependency with substitute dependees. Indeed, Alice and Jos are both able to fulfil 
alone the payment decision service.  
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Conversely in scenario 3, neither Alice nor Jos can achieve alone fulfilment of payment 
decision service. As such, scenario 3 is a good illustration of a dependency with 
complementary dependees. 
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Fig. 2. a. One Dependee - b.Substitute Dependees - c. Complementary Dependees 
5   Willingness Measures 
5.1   One depender-One Dependee 
In scenario 1, the willingness of Alice about “payment decision” dependum is 
clearly poor. The service is not critical at all for her, the pressure comes only from 
one depender and there is no reciprocal relationship. To improve her willingness, 
developers can firstly try to influence the criticality of the service for her. 
According to the definition of the criticality, a solution consists in creating a 
relation (precondition) between a goal of Alice and the “payment decision” 
dependum. This can be achieved by the introduction of a new condition that relates 
one of Alice’s goals to the dependum. For instance, to achieve her goal “do 
accouting”, Alice must have “payment decision” fulfilled (Fig.1a). 
If it is not possible to increase criticality or not enough; developers could try to 
increase pressure on the dependee. Following example 1, Alice has only one 
depender. Adding a new depender will contribute to increase her willingness. In his 
position of stock manager, now, Bert has to have “payment decision” achieved in 
order to authorize or not the entry of ordered item in the stock. This situation implies 
that Bert becomes an additional depender of the Bob-Alice dependency (Fig.1b). 
Finally, if previous measures are not possible or do not produce the desired results, 
developers could employ the reciprocity factor. In this situation, a reciprocal 
dependency is added between Alice and Bob. For example, according to the company 
procedures, the purchase manager is responsible for ordering office materials for all 
employees of the company. As a consequence, Alice relies on Bob to obtain the office 
material she needs. This situation implies the creation of a reciprocal dependency 
between Alice and Bob about the dependum “get office material” (Fig.1c). 
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5.1   One depender-Substitute Dependees 
In the second scenario, Bob seeks consent from Alice or Jos about the “payment 
decision” dependum. In the i* SD model, such situation leads to a dependency 
between Bob and Alice or Jos, where Alice and Jos are substitute dependees. As Bob 
may rely either on Alice or Jos for its dependum, we should evaluate both the 
willingness of Alice and Jos. 
The analysis of the willingness of Alice and Jos is quite similar and lead to the 
conclusion of a poor willingness about the service. For both Alice and Jos, the service 
is not critical, the pressure comes only from one depender, and there is no reciprocal 
relationship.  
As Alice and Jos are substitute dependees, the global willingness about the 
dependum for the depender Bob is the greatest one. Therefore to improve global 
willingness, we can chose to try to improve willingness of Alice, willingness of Jos or 
even both. To enable comparison with scenario 1, we focus on the solutions to 
increase Alice’s willingness. 
First option is to increase for Alice the criticality of the service. As the criticality is 
based on the value of the service for the agent intrinsically, the presence of another 
dependee should have no impact on the measures that could be taken. We can 
therefore use the same measure as for scenario 1, i.e. introduce a new constraint that 
states to achieve her goal “do accouting”, Alice must have “payment decision” 
fulfilled (Fig.3a). Thanks to the new constraint, the “payment decision” service 
becomes critical for Alice. In example 4, conclusion of this measure was an 
increasing of the criticality factor of Alice about the dependum.  
But, due to the introduction of a new dependee, this measure appears to have 
another consequence on the relationships between Bob, Alice and Jos. As Jos is also 
able to fulfil Alice’s critical service, Alice could initiate a dependency on Jos about it, 
in order for her to easily or better achieve her related goal, “do accounting”. We can 
consider that Alice is becoming an additional depender on the dependency Bob-Alice 
or Jos (Fig.3b). It increases the pressure factor of the other dependee(s), i.e. Jos, about 
the dependum. As a consequence, by making the dependum critical for a dependee, in 
a situation of substitute dependees, we not only have increased this dependee 
willingness but also the other dependee(s) willingness through an increasing of the 
pressure they face.  
In a situation with substitute dependees another measure may be used to increase 
criticality of the dependum for a dependee. It consists in creating incentives for the 
dependee about personnaly achieving the dependum.  
Scenario 4 Alice receives a bonus for each payment decision. Alice wants to 
increase her personal payoff. So she has interest in achieving herself “payment 
decision”. Bob can seek for Alice or Jos about payment decision. 
In the above scenario, Alice has now great interests in being the one that actually 
achieve “payment decision” while the situation of Jos is unchanged. It results in a 
situation of partial competition between Alice and Jos, indeed incentives are only on 
Alice’s side.  
Now, if we also create incentives for Jos to personally achieve “payment decision”, 
the competition becomes full. Configurations of competition between substitute 
dependees may considerably reduce chances of dependency failure for the depender. 
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If it is not possible to increase criticality or not enough, then we could try to 
increase pressure on the dependees. As for the criticality factor, we can reemploy the 
measure used in scenario 1, i.e. introduce an additional depender, Bert (Fig.3c). Such 
measure will always affect all dependees while its respective impact is based on the 
position criteria. Therefore, we have not only achieved increasing the pressure on 
Alice but also on Jos. 
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Fig. 3. Scenarios with Substitutes Dependees 
Finally, if previous measures are not possible or enough, we could act on the 
reciprocity factor. Like in scenario 1, we create an internal situation that implies the 
creation of a reciprocal dependency Alice-Bob about the dependum “get office 
material” (Fig.3d). The reciprocity factor of Alice has increased while Jos’ is 
unchanged. A situation of substitute dependees does not affect measures related to the 
reciprocity factor. 
To sum up, with the use of a number of different scenarios we have demonstrated 
that a situation of substitute dependees does not influence measures on pressure and 
reciprocity factor. Yet, it affects measures related to the criticality factor. In a 
dependency with substitute dependees, the global willingness about the dependum is 
the maximum of the willingness of the dependees. 
5.1   One depender-Complementary Dependees 
In scenario 3, Bob seeks the consent of Alice and Jos about “payment decision”. In 
the i* SD model, this situation leads to a dependency Bob-AliceandJos where Alice 
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and Jos are complementary dependees. As Bob have to rely on Alice and Jos for its 
dependum, we should evaluate both the willingness of Alice and Jos. 
The analysis of the willingness of Alice and Jos indicates that both of them 
demonstrate a poor willingness about the service. For both Alice and Jos, the service 
is not critical at all, the pressure comes only from one depender and there is no 
reciprocal relationship.  
As Alice and Jos are complementary dependees, the global willingness about the 
dependum for the depender Bob is the smallest willingness among the dependees. 
Therefore to improve global willingness, we have to improve willingness of all 
dependees, starting by the weakest. To enable comparison with previous scenarios, 
we consider that Alice is the weakest and therefore starts with solutions to increase 
Alice’s willingness. 
To increase Alice’s willingness, we first try to influence her criticality factor. Like 
in previous scenarios (1 and 2), we introduce a new situation to create a link between 
one of her goals and the dependum (Fig. 4.a and 4.b). Consequences of this measure 
are the same as for scenario 2, i.e. an increasing of Alice’s criticality factor and an 
increasing of the pressure on other dependee(s), i.e. Jos. Yet contrary to scenario 2, by 
definition, no competition settings can happen among complementary dependees.  
After criticality factor, we try to raise pressure on Alice about the dependum. As in 
scenario 2, increasing the pressure by the addition of a new depender impacts all 
dependees, i.e. Alice and Jos (Fig. 4.c).  
Finally to increase the reciprocity factor of Alice, we create a new relationship 
between Alice and Bob (Fig. 4.d). This situation affects Alice’s reciprocity factor 
without any impact on Jos’ willingness factor. 
In a dependency with complementary dependees, the global willingness about the 
dependum is the minimum of the willingness of the dependees. Consequently, 
measures to improve it should try to increase factors for dependee(s) with the lowest 
willingness. 
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Fig. 4. Complementary Dependees 
6   Delegation Measures 
In the previous section, we have analyzed measures to improve willingness through 
its different constituent elements. If these measures are still not enough to ensure 
minimum trust of the depender in dependency’s success, the depender may transform 
its dependency into a constraining delegation: delegation of obligation.  
A delegation of obligation gives an imperative order from the delegator on the 
execution, the access to or the fulfillment of the delegatum [4]. The delegator 
corresponds to the depender of the dependency and the delegatum is an expression of 
the dependum. 
In scenario 1, if all measures to improve willingness of Alice have failed, we can 
set up a delegation between Alice and Bob about the dependum. Concretely, Bob 
makes a positive delegation of obligation on Alice about the service “give payment 
decision”. A positive obligation means that Alice is force to do something, opposite to 
negative obligation force to not do. Moreover, in scenario 1, Bob has only one 
dependee, no alternative exists. Turned into a delegation, this situation leads to a blind 
delegation as the delegator has not sufficient information on the unique delegatee to 
form a trust opinion. Compare to other forms of delegation, a blind delegation will 
require a monitor in order to compensate the lack of trust in the delegatee. Bob would 
therefore add a monitoring agent on its delegation to Alice. 
In scenario 2 with substitute dependees, a delegation of obligation from Bob on 
Alice about the dependum will compensate lack of trust in dependency’s success (Fig. 
5). 
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Fig. 5. Substitute dependees enforced by delegation of obligation 
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Fig. 6. Complementary dependees enforced by delegation of obligation 
In scenario 3 with complementary dependees, the delegation of obligation must target 
all dependees, i.e. Alice and Jos, in order to compensate lack of trust in dependency’s 
success. Indeed, imposing a delegation only on some dependees would be inefficient 
as the trust in dependency’s success corresponds to the weakest willingness of the 
group of dependees (Figure 6). 
7   Related Work 
In the i* SD model, it is assumed throughout the analysis that the dependee will 
honour the dependency. However, this is not always the case meaning that the 
depender becomes vulnerable to the failure of the dependency [9]. As a consequence 
to the presence of such "down-side" of a dependency, evaluation of trust in the 
dependee about the dependum is crucial. 
The line of work initiated by Castelfranchi and Falcone [3] has highlighted the 
importance of a cognitive view of trust (particularly for Belief-Desire-Intention agents 
[8]). To evaluate the trust an actor place in another actor about a service, different 
beliefs related to the motivations of the agent are considered: competence, 
willingness, persistence and motivation. For example, the competence belief refers to 
the agent capability to the deliver the service. Additionally, in recent work, Giorgini 
et al. [5, 6], borrow the notion of capability to address the problem of trust in 
dependency. Their approach states that if an agent has both permission and capability 
14      S. DehousseP1P, S. FaulknerP1P, H. MouratidisP2P, M. KolpP3P, P. GiorginiP4P 
about a service, than the depender can be confident about dependency’s success. 
Permission can be the result of ownership or delegation while capability could also be 
delegated. While this approach is quite interesting, it just gives a partial view on trust 
in dependency, because, as noticed by Castelfranchi and Falcone, capability is only a 
pre-requisite to trust. Our work complements this approach by dealing with the impact 
of the other beliefs (willingness, persistence and motivation) on dependency’s failure. 
For sake of simplicity, we use the notion of agent’s willingness that regroups through 
its different determinants the characteristics of these beliefs. 
In the original work on i* SD model [9], the “down-side” of a dependency has 
been treated mainly through the concept of vulnerability. Surprisingly, this concept 
has not been clearly defined. More recent papers [7, 10] state that dependency 
relationships bring vulnerabilities to the system and the depending actor (the 
depender). However, our work has demonstrated that vulnerability of the depending 
actor is not a consequence of the dependency but rather an intrinsic property of the 
agent. Therefore, to clarify the situation, we have suggested a new definition for the 
concept of vulnerability. Moreover, we have suggested that the measures presented by 
Yu [9] to mitigate vulnerability were in fact measures to fortify the dependency by 
influencing dependee’s behaviour. 
8   Conclusion and Future Works 
In this paper we have argued that in order to fully reason about trust during the 
development of multiagent systems, developers should consider the willingness of a 
dependee to fulfill the dependum. We have also described an approach to reason 
about willingness of agents based on the concepts of criticality, pressure and 
reciprocity. Our approach provides a first solution to the vulnerability limitation 
demonstrated by the i* SD model, and therefore allows developers to reason about 
trust in a structured way.  
Our work is still at an exploratory stage. The proposed approach has been applied 
to various examples of case studies domains from the literature but it still remains to 
be applied in a large-scale real-life case study. It is worth commenting on the scope 
and the domain characteristics for which we believe the presented approach is 
appropriate. It is intended that the proposed process is performed by a software 
engineer (or software team), during design time, and not from software agents during 
run-time. We envisage the approach to be suitable for a large number of agent-based 
applications, where it is possible to identify stakeholders and their dependencies and 
where vulnerabilities of actor dependencies play an important role for the realization 
of the system’s goals. As such, we believe that our approach is not suitable for the 
development of embedded software or system software (operating systems for 
instance) since in such systems there are no identifiable stakeholders. Moreover, due 
to lack of automated tool support, and the difficulty in considering manually all the 
possible conflicts identified during the vulnerability analysis, we believe that our 
approach is suitable for analyzing small to medium size agent based systems of up to 
100 agents. We anticipate however that tool support will extend the applicability of 
the presented approach to large-scale real world agent-based applications. 
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This paper describes work in progress and future work includes the implementation 
of automatic tool support for the proposed approach as well as the development of a 
methodology to help computation of the willingness determinants based on refined 
formulae. We also plan to investigate solutions at the SD or SR levels that mitigate 
depender’s vulnerability. In particular, we believe it would be interesting to consider 
the introduction of new goals or softgoals that could impact depender’s vulnerability. 
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